I have a mindset that whenever change or unrest occurs or whenever a new document is introduced to cause a stir in Turkey, I immediately think of a development abroad.
I cannot help it but I am trying to look at the incident in Turkey from the outside.
For instance, no one can convince me that the Ergenekon case was prepared by internal dynamics only.
I noted several things about the "infamous document" on Sunday. I said that I found this document’s being appropriately dated as April 2009 interesting.
But why was it dated April 2009?
The said document was revealed on June 4. A case was filed in an Istanbul court on June 6. The document was published by Taraf daily on June 12. But the publisher used "April 2009" for the date.
On the other hand, Fethullah Gülen on April 8, 2009 released a paper on www.herkul.org and gave a brief on the content of the said document under the title "tahşiye" on June 4. The word "tahşiye" comes from the Ottoman language, a word that the late Bediüzzaman Said Nursi most often used in his Risale-i Nur Collection. It means a small explanatory note jotted down on a book page or a piece of paper.
Gülen, in his statement, writes: "God forbid... People who act as if they are on our side may be forced to have Kalashnikovs someday and be involved in action. Others may say afterwards ’Look, they are armed if necessary.’"
He, in a way, makes a prediction about the "Plan to finish off the AKP and Fethullah Gülen". On the other hand, the Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ in his April 14 statement openly pointed out Gülen as a target!
Now, let’s look at the recent past:
1) Turkish-American relations were harmed gravely by the March 1, 2003 deployment note in Parliament. The United States, for the first time, began to look for a new ally instead of Turkey in its policies in the region.
2) The Bush Administration back then planned to "change" some regimes in the Middle East. So they supposedly proscribed democracy. Democracy and Islam recalled the "Gülen Movement," rightfully at first. The Greater Middle East Project was designed on a development that the Gülen Movement already experienced and that may evolve into democracy.
And I think this was a good decision, theoretically. In 2003-2009, this alliance did work and the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK, devolved.
3) The Bush administration’s selfishness screwed up in the Greater Middle East Project and failed to establish order in Iraq.
4) On the other hand, the Gülen Movement between 2003 and 2009 exerted tremendous efforts to be effective both in northern Iraq and in Southeastern Turkey. They fed expectations inside the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, in a way that the party could wipe off the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party, or DTP, in the Southeast.
And the expectation was of a great deal of interest to U.S. northern Iraq policies.
5) However, that didn’t happen. The AKP was crushed in the southeast on March 29 and it emerged that the Gülen Movement was not very influential on Kurds.
6) In the mean time, Barack Obama was elected president and started to look for new allies to help the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and to protect U.S. interests in the country as he promised previously.
7) A new ally in Turkey could have been the TSK under Gen. Başbuğ; the ally that has all the required qualifications and has not been cold to U.S. policies in northern Iraq since March 1.
8) The new ally, however, would introduce new terms: the deactivation of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, by the United States and putting a distance between themselves and the Gülen Movement.
9) In fact Obama was ready to make a U-turn and was aware that the "old allies" in Turkey were disturbed by the Greater Middle East Project.