Is Turkey becoming a troublemaker in NATO?

The 26-member NATO will hold its 60th anniversary summit on April 3-4 in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany. The summit will produce the Declaration on the Alliance Security, a key document for NATO to renew its Strategic Concept by 2011. Afghanistan, the enlargement of the alliance to the Adriatic, the French return to the military wing and the problem of nuclear proliferation are among the top issues to be discussed during the meeting.

Turkey, however, a long-time member of the top security club, would attend the summit not in a very comfortable mood. Before exploring why, let’s underline the NATO’s importance for Turkey: Since its entry to the alliance in 1952, NATO has been the keystone of Turkey’s defense and security policy, as well as its strongest bond with the United States and Western European countries. Turkey served as the defender of NATO’s southeastern flank, in a volatile region bordering the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey did continue to provide security both in its region and elsewhere through active participation in NATO-led peace operations. Turkey’s contribution to the alliance has always found a warm welcome and praise from the allies and was rewarded in the choice of Istanbul as the venue of the 2004 NATO summit.

However, as many European diplomats put it, Turkey’s show of bad temper on some issues causes frustration and anger among some members. One of the main issues leading concerns is Turkey’s refusal to bargain in the context of NATO-EU relations. Turkey is accused of blocking the efforts to create a strong relationship between the two organizations, creating discomfort in both of them. "Turkey does not think that there is a problem. It neither brings its own proposals nor accepts ours. We are nearly at a dead end," a senior European official a while ago.

For Turkey, it’s a matter of principle and former assurances given by the alliance.

Turkish diplomats recall the deal made between NATO and the EU in 2002, called Berlin +, the arrangement whereby NATO offered to the EU the use of its assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. But it was NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer who complained about the deal in a speech last year.

"Berlin + has become too often a straitjacket rather than a facilitator. It is useful to have it as an important option, but we shouldn’t make it the only template for our relations. I would therefore like to see new, complementary options and possibilities whereby NATO and the EU can in principle have access to each other’s assets and capabilities, and which would allow us to plan in concert in those instances where Berlin + is clearly not the right framework. Let me be clear: both organizations would retain their independence and decision-making authority. That goes without saying."

Asking to renew the Berlin + deal is obviously a non-starter for Turkey, especially when its participation to the European Defense Agency is vetoed by the Greek Cypriots. But with the change of administration in Washington, which already announced its policy for "stronger and closer transatlantic ties," Turkey will likely face more pressure afterward.

The second problematic issue is the France’s return to NATO’s military wing. The French decision to resume its full place in NATO is warmly welcomed by almost all allies. In fact when Turkish diplomats positively evaluated France’s return, the prime minister and foreign minister gave the impression that they will first analyze the modalities of the move to decide whether approval from the Northern Alliance Council, the top decision-making body of the alliance, is needed. In earlier remarks Foreign Minister Ali Babacan did not rule out Turkey’s veto right, which would be legally justified but not politically correct. Turkey’s vague position in one of NATO’s most important decisions confused members of the alliance.

The third and one most current difficulty is the selection of the next secretary-general of NATO. Scheffer will leave office July 31, and Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen emerged as the firm favorite to take the post. Turkey’s objection to Rasmussen lies in Copenhagen’s unwillingness to stop Roj TV (known as the mouthpiece of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK) broadcasts in his country and an inability to handle the cartoon crisis. For all these reasons, it is likely that the next NATO chief will not be announced during the summit this week.

Having said all these, the answer to the question posed in the headline is no. Turkey is not a troublemaker in the alliance, and in fact it would be very unfair to say so. But it is also a fact that there is such a perception in many European countries.

Furthermore, the country’s top officials, with dramatically different statements on Rasmussen’s bid, somewhat created a perception of a two-headed state, not the best strategy in foreign policy-making.

In this age, foreign policy is conducted not only behind closed doors, through secret diplomacy. The success in foreign policy also depends on the ability to mold the public opinion inside and outside the country. And unfortunately, our government and foreign ministry has not passed the test so far.