Mehmet Ali Birand - English

Barack Obama has become the first American president to openly show the importance he places on Turkey in a concrete way. The details of speeches or negotiations are not important. What is important is the visit itself. We all watched how the anti-American feelings in Turkey were suddenly diminished after Obama won the election. Bush was so bad, and so severely hurt the image of the United States, that even if Obama does nothing to try and change it, the man himself is enough to change this perception.

Upon his arrival Sunday evening, the Turkish people embraced Obama. Not even his Kenyan origin or his sympathy for Islam is important. His attitude alone was enough to gain our regard.

In only one day, he fixed the U.S. image that Bush destroyed over eight years. Of course, we must not forget that there are things Obama can and cannot do.

The United States is a super power and such nations only pay attention to their own interests. So there is just one thing I would like to draw to your attention: Do not to believe in everything.

Former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was announced secretary-general of NATO during the alliance’s summit only after some promises were made to Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül stated that they received promises that Roj TV would be shut and Turkey would assume some posts in NATO.

In my article yesterday, I stated that the reaction to Rasmussen was correct, not an over-reaction, but taken only so far and left at that, and that the Turkish attitude was correct. In this article, I would like to warn my readers.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that one should not trust promises too much. Obama might promise as much as he likes, but if conditions change, then promises cannot be kept. Let’s keep that in mind. International relations are like that and no one can do anything about it.

Don’t forget Gen. Rogers agreement

I was on duty in Brussels during the negotiations over Greece’s departure and return to the NATO military wing after the Cyprus movement in 1974. I know each detail very well. The U.S. Gen. Rogers from the NATO forces signed an agreement with President Kenan Evren, the head of state and commander of the military coup on Sept. 12.

According to this agreement, one of the commands of NATO in the Aegean region was to be given to Turkey. But the most delicate part of this matter was that the Greeks did not want to sign such a document. The Americans were in a hurry to return Athens to NATO, so they put pressure on Ankara and said, "No document needed."

It was the era of the Sept. 12 military coup. The matter was resolved on a military basis. NATO military force commander Gen. Rogers promised Evren, "I give you my word as a soldier. The Greeks will accept your wish." And Evren as a soldier accepted his promise. What could be more valuable than a soldier’s promiseÉ?

I’ll never forget, a few weeks after this agreement, I joined another meeting in Brussels. During a meeting with Turkish parliamentarians, the U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, said, "Trust me. I will have the Rogers-Evren agreement implemented." Do you know what happened later?

The Greeks did not keep their promise. Maybe they never made such a promise and Gen. Rogers thought he would have the Greeks implement his promise to the Turks. It was too late when he noticed that he was mistaken. It was all over when he apologized to Evren later on. Greece went back to the NATO military wing in an inexpensive way. It did not pay anything in return.

In the same manner, Obama might forget his promise made in Strasbourg. To tell the truth, I think he will easily forget it. So has Turkey behaved foolishly by believing Obama and accepting Rasmussen’s candidacy? No.

Even if our exercise of power over Obama is not very strong, we have Rasmussen in our hands. We can put the NATO secretary-general through the wringer.

As far as Obama is concernedÉ I don’t think that after making such a promise the U.S. head of state will turn his back on us and look in a different direction.

Even if he forgets, Turkey will remind him quite often. Ankara is not as it used to be. It is no longer a capital that accepts every word spoken by Washington.

Turkey played a key role in a drama experienced over the weekend. Although it was not as harsh as the now-famous "Davos challenge" and did not shock public opinion, it preoccupied the international media for hours. Let me issue a reminder. Denmark’s Prime Minister Rasmussen ran a candidacy for NATO’s secretary-general. He was a candidate who was supported by 27 members of the European Union. Turkey was the only country that opposed his candidacy. Everybody was surprised since nobody expected such a thing. In the past, Turkey was a country that did what Washington and Brussels told it to do. A Turkish revolt with NATO was inconceivable.

Turkey had two reasons to react:

The first and the most important was the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK’s mouthpiece Roj TV’s broadcasting from a base in Denmark. Despite Turkey’s requests, demands and even reactions, Denmark Ğ maybe acting upon good grounds according to itself Ğ did not respond to these demands, pointing to human rights and freedom of expression, and the country’s own libertarian laws.

Let’s not beat about the bush! Denmark protected the Roj TV for bureaucratic reasons in order to support the PKK or to use it as a tool for pressure. Turkey applied to Rasmussen over the issue many times but failed to get a reply. The second reason was that Rasmussen did not offer an apology in relation to the broadcast of the caricatures which deeply offended the Islamic world.

Meanwhile, Rasmussen ran as a candidate for the NATO post of secretary-general and wanted Turkey’s support. Ankara said "NO."

At first, there was a general belief that Turkey would say "Yes" finally. However, Turkey kept saying "No" until the last minute and lifted its veto only when U.S. President Obama intervened and gave promises about some subjects whose details we still do not know. I am a person who has criticized Prime Minister Erdoğan’s many approaches but I think he did the right thing this time.

"At last, someone came out and rejected to abide by everything they say," I thought and calmed down.

Some should account for now ...

I do not think that Turkey’s stance over the caricature incident is consistent. It is an event that happened two years ago. It upset the Muslim world, but it passed. Even Iran and Saudi Arabia forgot the incident and what is more interesting is that they did not oppose Rasmussen’s candidacy to the NATO post of secretary general by pointing to the incident.

So, why did we oppose it? Behind this stance, there is not a will to make Rasmussen offer an apology but to draw the sympathy of the Muslim world. Raising this matter has increased the prestige of Muslim Turkey, a member of the Western world. Turkey showed that it is not a toy dog that does everything the West says and it can utter the sensitivities of the Muslims. "I can convey your sensitivities to the Western World when required. And I can call them to account for," was Turkey’s message to the Islamic world. When compared to the past, it has adopted a different stance.

Erdoğan’s second reason was Rasmussen’s stance about Roj TV. Indeed, what was done is a part of a play but this time, Ankara played its part well. If Turkey suffers because of PKK terror, a TV channel supports this terrorism and a country, which accepts us as an ally, protects the channel, then I have a right not to fulfill what this country demands. The prime minister raised the tension and made U.S. President Obama intervene. By this way, before Obama’s visit to Turkey, the prime minister had clearly showed him how much further he could carry his sensitivity over the PKK. He did the right thing. We cannot know whether the promises that were made thanks to Obama will be fulfilled. However, Turkey delivered its message and showed its sensitivity on the subject. Even this is enough.

Olli Rehn’s unnecessary challenge

Those, who follow my articles, know that I am a person who supports Turkey’s membership to the EU very much and maintains the support without getting tired. Moreover, I am closely acquainted with Olli Rehn and I know that he is in favor of Turkey’s full membership. However, his statement that Turkey’s veto would adversely affect its membership process to the EU, which he made in the middle of the debates over NATO’s secretary-general, was a complete "disaster." What does this mean? Should Turkey do everything that the EU says in order to become a member of the EU? When was the NATO’s secretary-general issue included into the Copenhagen criteria?

If we veto Rasmussen, the EU membership process will be adversely affected. Turkey accepted Rasmussen’s getting the post of secretary-general, what will happen now? Will the membership process gain speed? For example, will the eight chapters, which have been suspended because of energy and Cyprus issues, be reopened? I think Rehn must have realized that he unknowingly made an ill-fated statement. I am glad that Turkey conditionally said "Yes" to Rasmussen. Maybe, in this way, Europe sees that it cannot make Turkey accept everything it says while casting it out and prolonging the negotiation process. Turkey played its cards well without exaggerating.

All segments that consider themselves to the left of center have a very interesting ambition. Their ambition, at all cost, is to take down Deniz Baykal from his position and have someone else take his place. Baykal has become the target of this segment. Anytime the CHP does not obtain enough votes they blame Baykal. But they never succeed. Recent changes in the statute have reached the central office. Recent local elections show that the results for the CHP are not bad after all. It acquired the coastal line and increased its presence in big cities. Smiles appeared on the faces of party members. Despite this, the lobby for changing Baykal has found itself a new candidate: Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The 37 percent vote obtained by the candidate for the Istanbul Municipality and his campaign against Topbaş attracted attention. Not only votes but also Kılıçdaroğlu’s general attitude, style in his speeches, his appearance symbolizing modesty and decency made him all of a sudden very popular and started to increase the desire of the Anti-Baykal lobby.

No matter how explicitly Kılıçdaroğlu stated he would not get himself into this struggle, hopes have not ceased completely.

There are general elections in 2011.

Approximately two years from now Turkey will again cast a ballot. And with an injured AKP and an expected increase in unemployment and economic crisis in the future it seems that the AKP will sweat and CHP’s chances increase even more. So then let’s ask ourselves: Would a new chairman crisis in the CHP help the party or inflict a heavy blow?

You might be at a difference of opinion with Baykal. I too object to some of his politics. But during this phase you might guess that CHP entering a leadership struggle and spending all the party’s energy on a congress fight would inflict evil on the party.

Two years will pass in no time. To spend almost half of the precious time during this period for such a useless leadership fight would be equal to betraying Turkey.

If AKP can’t stop decline, it’ll lose general elections

Leave it at that and let’s enter 2011 general elections with Baykal. Kılıçdaroğlu is a young person. When the time comes he will become a leader anyway. The smartest move for the CHP today is to gain momentum as it prepares for general elections.

AKP obtaining 38 percent of the votes, in other words facing a 9 point drop, has created concern in one part of Turkey and obvious relief in another part. Members of the AKP are concerned, others hopeful.

I am one of those who believe that the AKP has not weakened, but only received a warning. This party seems to be declining as a result of the economic crisis and depreciation over six years of administration.

But danger stirs from exactly these two factors. The economic crisis will continue. Even increase in months to come. The general expectation is there will be improvement starting in 2010. In this case, it might be too late for elections in 2011.

Unemployment figures are especially scary and they are expected to get worse. Each unemployed person means one family will be worse off and blame the party in power for it. There, in elections two years from now the biggest threat the AKP will face will not be CHP or MHP but unemployed people resulting from the economic crisis.

Thus, Prime Minister Erdoğan needs to follow extremely striking and influential politics. Only this way will he be able to save himself and his party. Otherwise Erdoğan will have a hard time. With great possibility Turkey will again enter a period of coalition.

Could the prime minister change?

Can Erdoğan be smooth and understanding instead of tense and brisk?

Why not? Maybe a little difficult, nevertheless he must try.

The most important part of these elections for me is the ballot results from the Southeastern region. This result has shifted the Kurdish issue in a different direction. First, let’s compare the vote distribution of the elections of 2007 and today. You’ll remember, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, experienced a very surprising development during the 2007 elections as the Democratic Society Party, or DTP, suffered an important loss in the region, obtaining only 4.9 percent of the votes. The AKP suddenly took the position of a new player in the region. This was important because the AKP’s rise made it a real possibility that the DTP could be kicked out of the region if it pushed the limits.

The AKP’s self-confidence increased. Southeastern voters supported those who served right and not for the sake of Kurdishness. This belief excited the AKP in the local elections in 2009. If such a development was to be realized, then a great loss of prestige could be inflicted on the terror organization. The prime minister rolled up his sleeves and realized an extremely ambitious campaign. He confronted citizens of Kurdish origin.

AKP beaten by its own politics in Southeast

He said: "If you wish to obtain services, vote for us. If you wish to obtain an identity, then vote for someone else." He even gave speeches that implied "love it or leave it." The goal was to show the Kurdish voters a carrot, state that the DTP is not able to supply municipality services properly and send across the message, "If you vote for me I’ll supply my services." But he was not content with this message and instead distributed attractive commodities like coal and washing machines in the region. He blinked at them by saying, "I’ll make you rich." There is more É

With TRT-6 he tried to satisfy the Kurds’ identity expectation, and by using a Kurdish sentence during Nevruz (the coming of spring) festivities, he tried to satisfy their language expectations. Many of us believed that the AKP was closer to the Kurdish issue and that if there were a leader who could solve this problem, it would be him. Such an impression had emerged. But the AKP could not make it up to our citizens of Kurdish origin. One reason was that it did not take concrete steps, meaning it could not meet the expectation of Kurdish citizens. Other reasons include unique perceptions of Kurds.

w The Kurds reacted to Erdoğan creating an environment full of expectations but not sticking to his promises. They realized and concluded that they are facing a prime minister who only speaks but does not take action.

w This belief was also strengthened by taking slow steps toward the European Union and nearly shelving the project.

w Attempts by the AKP in Diyarbakır to lay their hand on places like Tunceli, which is considered the castle of the DTP, scared the Kurds and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or the PKK. They could not accept such a risk. Therefore they withdrew and consolidated against the AKP.

w The government’s brisk attitude against the northern Iraqi Kurdistan regional administration, especially last year, has also created an adverse reaction.

w Finally, another important aspect is last year’s military movements, the bombing of northern Iraqi PKK targets and extremely brisk interventions by the police in demonstrations in the region.

Along all these, the psychological campaign pursued by the DTP was very successful as well. The attitude, "Those who feel like a Kurd will vote for us. Not for the AKP. If you vote for the AKP, you’ll lose your Kurdish identity," was very effective. And when the DTP set the PKK and its sympathizers in motion, the population in the region adopted a conscious attitude. Election results featured the Kurdish identity. While increasing its votes from 4.9 to 5.6 percent, the DTP took back three new and many former provinces from the AKP. It increased the number of collectively controlled 56 municipalities to 98. What’s more important is that Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir broke a record by obtaining 65 percent of the votes.

The Kurdish messages were very clear:

The Kurdish identity is more important than anything else. No matter how much service you supply, the priority is the acceptance of our Kurdish identity. The Kurdish issue will be solved with politics, not weapons. The DTP needs to be our addressee for the Kurdish issue. This party represents us. It would be a pity if these three messages were not taken seriously by Ankara.

Let’s not push the DTP outside the system

If we evaluate the election results with a clear mind, we notice the necessity that the first step to be taken is to include the DTP in the system. Attitudes like not shaking hands with DTP deputies, not participating in programs they participate in, not inviting them although they are on the protocol list, should be abandoned. Instead of excluding the DTP, it is inevitable to embrace them and accept them as the addressee for steps to be taken in the Kurdish issue.

Elections are over, now its time to do some accounting. I want to look at who won what and who lost what. At the bottom of it, we are talking about "a message given by the people." Whereas, I don’t believe that people intended to send a message as put forth by the media. People above all want two things: * Work and food to feed themselves...

* To live in peace, away from conflict...

Apart from that, especially this time attention has been paid to sharp ideological lines while voting. For example, those who in general adopted a secular lifestyle have put aside their concerns of the CHP being good or bad, Deniz Baykal leading the party well or not, and their liberal or democratic standpoint. They gave their votes to the CHP without a second thought. Alike, people of Kurdish origin or those who voted for a party that they consider close in terms of ideology have either reverted to their former parties or went out of their homes for the sake of voting. An 80 percent participation rate indicated this tendency in society.

Now let’s draw up a balance sheet and take a look at surprises in these election, and those who lost while they were thinking they won.

"I won," whereas he lost

Because of his close attention to Uğur Dündar and me, I watched Ankara closely during these elections. Melih Gökçek was very tense. The same tension was present in him during Election Day as it was during the whole campaign. In every speech he said Kanal D and Star TV are still pursuing a smear campaign. He made these allegations in such a brisk way using such an unattractive body language that it turned against him. His decline started with a panel discussion in which he participated with Kılıçdaroğlu. It accelerated with each passing day. As Gökçek became more brisk his loss of votes grew.

The result is obvious.

He won 2004 local elections with a record high of 55 percent. This time it fell back to 38. Gökçek won the elections but when we analyze the numbers we find out whether he won or not. It is difficult to account for such a loss of votes.

And then there is one person who despite losing won in the eyes of the public: Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

Kılıçdaroğlu led an extremely basic campaign. He only stressed one matter and that was the struggle against corruption. The CHP provincial chairman Gürsel Tekin and Kılıçdaroğlu have formed an easy-going team. They took their part on stage with words that are understandable and a posture that is presentable.

They told the daily Posta during a visit, "We will quit politics if we don’t receive 40 percent of the votes." They kept their word. CHP increased its votes to 37.

In one of my previous articles I wrote, "Kılıçdaroğlu won’t win Istanbul but push Topbaş all the way." That’s what happened. Topbaş’s greatest advantage was his successful chairmanship in Istanbul.

In the end Kılıçdaroğlu lost but the CHP and Turkish politics have gained a new person.

Not he himself but AKP made them lose

One election result that stunned everybody, especially the prime minister, was obtained in Antalya.

Menderes Türel was known as a very successful mayor. He made many contributions to Antalya and changed many things in the city. He was also a candidate who collected points for his sympathy and friendly personality. He was expected to win with a great difference but his loss created a shock.

On second thought, Menderes Türel did not lose. More precisely, the reason for his loss was not a lack of performance. He lost because he was with the AKP. As voters in Antalya went back to their former parties away from the AKP, Türel did not receive enough votes.

CHP’s candidate Mustafa Akaydın was an extremely esteemed person. He had no experience in municipality work but when he was rector the AKP did him wrong. When voters got scared by the AKP they preferred the CHP.

In this case it is more correct to ask the question of who lost: the AKP or Antalya?

Erdoğan is a prime minister with self-confidence who said that in these elections his party would take approximately 47 to 50 percent of the votes. To tell the truth, it was not expected that the AKP would lose an important part of its votes While evaluating the results of the current elections we need to pay attention to expectations and how the campaigns went.

Turkish society has perceived the current elections as general elections not as local elections. To be more precise, circumstances have changed color and the eyes turned toward the general vote distribution.

The campaign was foremost headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. With an incredible energy he bore all the load of the party on his shoulders.

He travelled to 66 provinces. He targeted the opposition and the Doğan Group. He constantly attacked these two targets at rallies.

Wherever he went he held fierce speeches, increased tension so much that in the end this campaign turned into a referendum by Erdoğan.

Erdoğan was a prime minister with self-confidence and who said that in these elections his party would take approximately 47 to 50 percent of the votes. To tell the truth, it was not expected that the AKP would lose an important part of its votes.

Technically the AKP exhibited a performance that would leave all opposition in the shadow. It used all of the administration’s means. It mobilized means supplied by the government and the municipalities. It always went ahead with distributing presents and using state-owned transportation means before the elections.

In view of all this data, how should we evaluate the vote percentage of 39 received by the AKP? I think the AKP has not lost the current elections.

A 39 percent vote is very important for a party. Turkish society has shown that it did not turn its back on the AKP. It is very important that this party has still reached 39 despite the fact that hundreds of thousands people lost their jobs due to the economic crisis.

Are the reasons for the loss apparent?

I accept, it is an important decline in votes as the former 47 percent vote has dropped to 39 percent but we need to say that the AKP’s pin has not been pulled yet. Despite important losses in some municipalities we need to underline that in Istanbul and Ankara the castles are still standing.

So if the backs were not turned on the AKP, then what does this vote percentage mean?

I think, Turkish society sent a warning to the AKP and foremost to the prime minister. The best slogan in this regard came from daily Zaman columnist Hüseyin Gülerce during a chat on CNNTürk, "The Turkish society told the AKP ’One Minute.’" We might also call it an "uncommitted yellow card."

Whatever you call it there is a discontent present. This discontent includes the general attitude of the prime minister and the "economic crisis that has not been tangent." The prime minister has caused the society to be very tense.

He took on a brisk attitude that might have been justified or not. He increased his attitude exhibited in Davos. For an instant he turned each rally meeting into a fight. I think, people are sick of it.

Another mature speech from the PM

Turkish people don’t want to fight.

People want employment, to earn money and to live in comfort.

The AKP’s charm in the beginning has vanished.

The prime minister has again after the elections held a mature balcony speech. You will surely remember his speech after the 2007 general elections and again he correctly analyzed the situation.

He said the message sent by the society will be analyzed in detail and necessary lessons will be learned.

We wish the prime minister won’t forget his words like he did in 2007. After the general elections he said he’d embrace everyone but instead he increased tension.

If the prime minister reads the results carefully he might prevent a future defeat for the AKP in the upcoming elections in two years. Otherwise, devastation by the expectedly increasing crisis and new tensions could bring the AKP a heavy defeat or even come to a point of losing their power.

In summary, neither should the opposition announce victory and declare the end of the AKP’s power, nor the governing party continue with its boorish attitude.

Don’t get stuck in the argument over whether or not President Gül has pronounced the word Kurdistan. Even if this word was not really spoken Turkey’s president embraced Kurds in northern Iraq. He has addressed them with the title (Kurdistan regional administration) written in the Iraqi constitution. Turkish diplomats have repeated how important this step was. In my article yesterday I drew attention to the fact that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, elimination process has started. Today I want to talk about how this process will take place, about who will take part and when a result is to be expected.

What needs to be known upfront is that there are two main actors in this scenario. One is Turkey and the other is the northern Iraqi Kurds. Then there are side actors. These are headed by the United States. One other effective actor is the Iraqi central administration, i.e. Baghdad. There is no written document or plan. Only ideas. They say, "It would be good if you do this, and we will do that." Then new ideas emerge. It will proceed this way. Let me give a more concrete example.

There is talk about steps that will be taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MIT, the General Staff and the government in Ankara. The start of TRT 6, the prime minister speaking a Kurdish word, the president throwing flowers to the northern Iraqi administration all are perceived as steps. In exchange the northern Iraqi administration must have told the PKK that it needs to stop attacks in Turkey because there has been no incident in the past few months. These steps will continue. How long will this go on? This is not for sure yet. The most critical and the most tangled part here is bringing down the PKK from the mountains.

There are two segments of the PKK. One is the militant followers and the other is the leadership. There are two choices to bring the militant followers down from the mountains. Either Turkey has to be more flexible in the application of the current amnesty law and ensure those who descend from the mountains are sent home instead of sent to jail, or else it needs to pass a new law. The government does not approve of a new law. It insists on a change of the application of the current law.

The former practice abroad of catching and delivering the leaders to Turkey is changing. It becomes apparent that the government will close its eyes to these people immigrating to various European countries. The most important turning point of this process will be the Kurdish conference in April or May to be assembled by the northern Iraqi administration leader Massoud Barzani.

During this conference there will be an appeal made to the PKK to put down its weapons. If the PKK does not obey this appeal then Barzani will take up the matter. And what will Turkey do in exchange? Everything is mutual. Ankara needs to do something in return. This will be taking steps toward the amnesty and Kurdish issue. At the moment details are discussed between Washington, Arbil, Baghdad and Ankara. How long will these efforts last?

Nobody can give an exact date regarding this matter. As a matter of fact, it is not for sure whether or not this process will be successful. For, this upswing could change anytime or calculations could go wrong and this process would fail. Nobody can say anything definite. Those who know and influence this process told me and I always keep it in mind:

"For the first time the function of the PKK started to decrease. The PKK in itself and those supporting it want terror to end. For the first time we have entered a hopeful process." I too want to be hopeful. But let’s not forget that conditions might change at any minute.

I was glad to go when I was invited to join President Abdullah Gül on his trip and see how Iraq changed over the seven years during which I did not visit the country. I did not anticipate the two-day visit would go beyond political content and send messages about friendship, fellowship or featuring embraces and back-patting. Turkey, after 33 years, was about to enter a display of friendship. What else could be expected? Some conversation about the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, of course. That’s about it.

However, as soon as I entered the aircraft, all of a sudden, I felt that the compass needle was pointing in a different direction. We found out, for example, that President Gül insisted, until the last minute, on including Arbil, Kirkuk, Basra and Najaf in this trip but was convinced otherwise because of security reasons. That is to say that he tried to squeeze Arbil into the program. Afterward, you read about the statements.

Gül made a statement that was equivalent to recognizing the Kurdistan administration and for the first time openly referred to the "Kurdistan regional administration." He formally accepted the prime minister of this administration. (1) Talabani said, "The PKK either puts down its weapons or leaves the country." I know that something is cooking but cannot quite comprehend it. Finally I pulled up my sleeves and started to talk one by one to Neçirvan Barzani, prime minister of the northern Iraqi administration, other upper-level authorities of the northern Iraqi administration and those on the president’s committee. A totally different scene resulted. Today and tomorrow I will draw a broad picture.

I might be mistaken about details or developments and change estimations. But I’m positive that the general frame is correct.

The moment you ask this question you might find an important clue to the puzzle. The reason is basic: The rapprochement between Turkey and the Kurdistan regional administration has developed in such a way that the PKK, at least for a while, had to stay away from attempts at violence. This is a symbol for how the consensus between Ankara and Arbil has deepened. We are not very much aware of it but the mutual trust between Ankara and Arbil is beyond our imagination. Northern Iraqi Kurds have made their choice.

They decided whether to lean their backs on Iran or Turkey: Turkey É And Turkey has very well understood that without the help of northern Iraqi Kurds it will not be able to cast off the PKK from the region. The former politics, which were based on pushing the Kurds around and thinking of them as anything but human, have been banned. Turkey has adopted an approach of treating Barzani the way he deserves to be treated. Behind Gül’s addressing the Kurdistan regional administration (despite the fact that he denied it later on) lays the new approach. For this word in an indirect way implies that "sometime Kurdistan will be recognized."

One other piece of the puzzle is the attitude of the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK. Be it matters regarding northern Iraq or the PKK, it is hard to come to a solution without cooperation with the TSK. During this trip I learned that at the top level of the General Staff and the government there is a consensus. The TSK has slowly started to change its implicit attitude toward the northern Iraqi administration. It has openly accepted in important divisions of the TSK that the struggle with the PKK is not to be solved with weapons. To help with the process, it accepted Barzani’s suggestions and decreased operations directed toward the PKK to a certain extent.

This means, the approach "as long as the PKK does not shoot we will monitor them from a distance," has gained importance. Of course, if tomorrow a bomb goes off somewhere, the whole process may change in an instant. So who leads this process and how? Who influences it? What is the process? I will try to explain all of it in my article tomorrow.

Did Gül say Kurdistan or not?

1- Arguments still continue, but I wrote about my opinion yesterday. I would like to repeat: Upon his arrival in Turkey, the president said that he did not pronounce the word "Kurdistan." Maybe this word he did not pronounce, but he pointed at the "Kurdistan regional administration" as formally written in the Iraqi constitution of the northern Iraqi Kurds. He talked about Kurds living in the north of the country. As a matter of fact, he said they count as our siblings and relatives and touched on how meaningless it would be to deny it. He said this word is not an obsession for Turkey. All journalists present there heard his words. It was openly argued between himself and diplomats of foreign affairs about the meaning and importance of saying "Kurdistan regional administration," for that matter. We were informed about how historical and brave the president’s statements were.