Mehmet Ali Birand - English

If the Ergenekon case aims to judge coup provocateurs in Turkey or to block coup processes in Turkey forever then in principle I believe in this case and support it. I wouldn’t want coups and military provocations to be left unpunished. But I oppose the method, the attitude that crosses the line between opposition and coup, and the boorishness in judgment and police mechanisms. The below article is an identification. Please read it within this frame of mind and don’t infer any needless meaning from it. The Ergenekon case stuns us all. It might be extremely transparent to some of us but an important part of the public does not quite understand the "organization" yet. The connection between its founders, members and leaders are not fully understood by anyone. When the public encountered it for the first time it was introduced as "an organization that consists of people or groups who were planning act to provoke and split society, and create chaos in order to pave the way for a military coup."

The first indictment consisting of 2,500 pages was enough to create question marks regarding the identity of people taken in custody. For, some of the organizations founders, leaders and members were fighting among themselves. Their focus was their diametrically opposing views under the national umbrella. It was difficult to label some part as "pro-coup or coup conspirator." On top of that the first indictment included thousands of personal telephone conversations rather than concrete evidence. Some of them were convincing and some smelled like a conspiracy theory. There was no concrete evidence that led to a coup. There were weapons and bombs but wasn’t there need for pro-coup people? There were Özden Örnek’s diaries but he wasn’t even a witness.

Then there were new detentions, new unexpected searches. It was as if each search led to new documents and despite the fact that the case already started it was perceived as if the investigation continued with "new searches and detentions." There were people among those taken into custody where one thought they’d never get together for such an event. This at least was the perception in the public. The indictment is talking about an incredible conspiracy theory and is drawing very strong groups into it.

The other factor drawing one’s attention in the indictment was the incredible courage of the prosecutors and their violation of accustomed investigation principles. While in another event Ğ Şemdinli Ğ prosecutors were easily punished, eyes were shut here. One other aspect we are accustomed to is that investigations are conducted by prosecutors, and searches and detentions are left to the police. This time, on the contrary, it seemed as if the police were in charge of the investigations. One other belief of the public is that in big investigations like these the administration always has a say and no prosecutor could dare taking such brave steps, especially arresting 4-star generals without the support of the administration. The leaking of information regarding investigations, which are supposed to be carried out secretly, to the pro-AKP press and its judgment therein increased fingerprints of the administration. Especially an announcement regarding the accusations against the Ministry of Education during the 12th Ergenekon wave along the lines of "They spoke to upper level members of the Ergenekon over the phone" intensified the shadow of the administration in this case.

Result: The Ergenekon case was nothing but a campaign conducted by the judiciary in the name of the AKP aiming to silence the opposition.

But the second indictment showed the seriousness of the matter: for the first time coup diaries were included. Coup preparations in 2003-2004 and real coup attempts were possibly to be brought before the court. The second indictment caused coup attempts to be viewed in a more transparent way. Allegations in the Ergenekon case have become more concrete.

Where did the 12th wave come from?

While the situation became more serious the 12th wave emerged. The Association for Supporting Contemporary Living might have been "pro-coup" in the eyes of the prosecutors but in the eyes of the secular public it is an association that provides education for poor children. The chairwoman Türkan Saylan is a person who says," Neither coup nor Shariah." The ripping into shreds of this association by the 12th wave of the investigation put everything out of balance. The same prosecutor discharging an important part of those taken into custody after their testimony was considered very strange. Suspicions of the Ergenekon case being an operation aiming to silence the opposition were raised again.

At this point people ask the same questions: How long will this go on? How far will this go?

This case has been extended so much, it has branched out so much and it has become so chaotic that it has reached a point where one doesn’t know how to get out of it. It seems extremely difficult for judges to solve such a chaotic investigation. But prosecutors seem so self-confident. They still leak information firstly to pro-AKP media and continue with detentions without considering and attaching importance to the secular public. But today criticism has expanded so much that a basic question arises: Is the AKP’s support really unlimited? I don’t think so. There are two years left until general elections. This case progressing at this speed is a sign of a danger for the case not only in secular or opposing sections of society but also for those close to the administration receiving reactions like "the methods of the prosecution are wrong."

When the Ergenekon investigation started, the AKP front was very self-confident. Pro-coup people were to be judged for the first time and those "untouchable" were to be touched. But the investigation is stretching and fails to meet its target. Governments are very realistic institutions. When things go well they provide support but when things turn around they pull the string. Ergenekon prosecutors have not much time left.

If they fail to conclude this investigation in the short run and fail to turn this case into a case in which "pro-coup people come to account," then their strings will be pulled just like the prosecutor in Şemdinli. Prosecutor Öz must have thought about this possibility when last week he said that "one day his competencies might be suspended temporarily."

The Ergenekon case will either concentrate around itself and in a narrow frame or lose speed progressively. The case will turn into the DİSK case and be forgotten slowly. And prosecutors who terrorize today will vanish. But it is a pity that such a result will lead Turkey back into the old vicious cycle. Pro-coup people will go on with their lives. Put their nose into all matters of the country. Call someone "traitor" and call someone else something else. Constantly plan conspiracies and be protected by the state. Isn’t it a pity? It’s best if this investigation be rapped up and put back on track or they should pack their bags (!)

I’m not quite sure. And probably millions of people don’t understand just like me. But I guess these Ergenekon prosecutors know something. But we cannot make anything out of it. Eight detainees were released by prosecutors who ordered their detention within the frame of the Association for Supporting Contemporary Living. What is this? I was stunned even further as Tijen Mergen, a member of the board for Doğan Gazetecilik, explained. We are living through an incredibly hard process.

You arrest people based on only telephone conversations and then set them free, saying "pardon us." In contemporary society and developed democracies, the conditions of such prosecutors are being questioned and sanctions imposed. However, everybody keeps quiet. In the meantime, the Deniz Feneri case, including concrete evidence, has been in translation for 49 days now. This means, on one side a case progressing at the "speed of light" but on the other side another "case" that is not going anywhere. An important case is diluted openly.

Those who read my articles will know that we take the Ergenekon case seriously. We believe that those who plan a coup on the government by means of a conspiracy must be punished. We believe that all people who cause chaos because they want to get rid of the government they don’t like, who violate laws and basic rules of democracy, be it the military of civilians, need to be tried. And we supported the Ergenekon investigation as long as it stayed within this frame. We will continue with our support. But this investigation from time to time goes beyond its real target and purpose. The measure slips. Ergenekon becomes diluted. Real criminals and pro-coup people are confused with democratic opponents. Civil society organizations are scared away.

An important part of the public believes that criminals and innocent people are being put in the same basket and that the dimension of this case is expanding, which makes it impossible to get out of the situation. Real criminals will profit from this situation. Real pro-coup people, real Deep State, real gangsters will profit.

The Ergenekon investigation is unfortunately facing such a danger. It is the danger that with the intent of searching for criminals it has transformed into an opposition hunt. The line between pro-coup or conspirator and the opposition has disappeared. A very correct and necessary investigation is missing its target. The real pro-coup and real criminals are very happy about it. We are facing a danger of hurting democracy badly by trying to put democracy on healthy grounds. Consider yourself warned.

There is one part of the speech by Chief of General Staff Gen. Başbuğ that really gets to you. Commentators did not persist on it much. Başbuğ first drew a portrait of a terrorist. Then he gave very interesting numbers regarding those who lost their lives in the war. I have collected these data for you.

Who is the child we call terrorist?
In the frame of data collected by security forces over many years the portrait of whom we call a "PKK terrorist" is as follows:

w Seventy percent of those who go into the mountains for the PKK are between the ages of 14 and 20. Meaning, youngsters who are just starting life.

w And the reasons they go into the mountains are as follows:

w Because he is unloved, poor, unemployed and hopeless, and lives in a violent environment.

w Because he lives with violence, gets used to it and thinks that violence will solve problems.

w Because no education is offered to him, he feels isolated and believes he is treated unjustly.

w Because he believes that by going into the mountains, he will be good for something, obtain right with his weapon and have an identity.

w Because he is influenced by ethnic propaganda.

w Eighty percent of those going into the mountains stay on average 10 years with the organization. By the time they turn 26 or 30, they either die or run away.

w The number of those who have died for the PKK since 1984 is more than 40,000. Meaning, one or more members of 40,000 families have been affected by this.

w The number of Turkish security forces killed since 1984 has amounted to 4,970.

This picture is unfortunate for the PKK. In exchange for so many losses, there is almost nothing they have obtained. It is obvious that from now on it will not be able to establish its influence. People in the region sending their children off to death bear a very heavy responsibility.

Reflections on Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ’s speech held Tuesday continue. After the "Military lesson" at the War Academy I have watched all discussions on TV, listened to them on radio and read yesterday’s comments. I have come to the conclusion that Başbuğ could not impress anybody and minds are still confused. As I mentioned in my article yesterday, this speech has been expected for a long time. Başbuğ must have had the urge to make such a speech because he fanned the flames. The range of people invited showed that it was intended to have the discussion spread on a wide range. In military and in civil circles expectations were present. One segment was expecting the first chief to put his fist on the table; the other expected him to submit. Both sides did not obtain their expectations. They were disappointed. Başbuğ preferred a compromise. He started off with philosophical and abstract concepts and theorized his attitude. That’s why he could not impress anyone. Everybody got out of the speech whatever he or she wanted.

Today let’s leave this aside and take some parts of the speech with a pair of tweezers for examination. An aspect that attracted my attention the most and was mentioned in the paper yesterday the most was that despite the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK emphasizing its loyalty to democracy it perceives itself having equal status as the civil authority and openly expresses it. No matter how much Başbuğ states his loyalty to democracy and to civil authority, which speaks the last word, he stressed the fact that regarding military matters an autonomous system is needed and if the military view and advice are not considered, then responsibility will fall on politicians. He emphasized that not all decisions are in the hands of the civil administration and the military needs to act together in an equal way with the civil authority.

According to some the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP, lost 9 points in local elections, which reflects the effort to elevate the military’s status. It is desired to put the balance back in place. One other striking point encoded in Başbuğ’s speech was his brisk reaction to the Fethullah Gülen community. This approach is not anything new. But this time is was more brisk. This time he stressed the community’s image shaping the socio-political life and exaggerating their strength. Başbuğ exhibited an attitude. Could the Gülen community be the addressee of such a polemic? How decent could it be for the TSK to address such a particular community? If we speak of danger wouldn’t it have sufficed to just draw attention to the community structure? Doesn’t such a "direct reference" wake a thought in the mind of the community, "They take us as an addressee so we really must be strong."

When following the media you’ll notice that one part of society is very excited about Başbuğ’s speech and talks about a relaxation in the Kurdish issue, even if it was "implied." Yes, his approach was human. He tried to understand people in the region and exhibited an attitude implying empathy. He talked about more welfare, equal opportunity, provision of personal development for people in the region and that the perception of unjust treatment needs to change. And with implicit self-criticism he said that some government officials in the region make mistakes in their approach to the people. Be it the part of his speech about terrorists being human as well and a new act facilitating the retreat from the mountains have attracted the attention of many commentators. Başbuğ perceiving terrorists as human is not new. He has only rephrased old sayings like preventing those who want to go up into the mountains from doing so or encouraging those up there to come down into an academic structure. Some asked, "Did the military give a green light for a pardon?" Hope it’s true. The part where he explained the difference between "The Turkish people" and "People of Turkey" was in my opinion the most striking indicator of a change of mind in the military. Imagine "Being from Turkey" instead of the existing "Being Turkish" statement in all headquarters is stressed. Doesn’t only the thought of it show this novelty?

An important tendency that I noticed regarding the Kurdish issue is Başbuğ’s positive and careful approach regarding relations with the northern Iraqi Kurdish administration. In old times the military used to criticize Iraqi Kurds. Now there is a moderate expectation.

Gen. Başbuğ has placed himself in a good position on the agenda. Now we learn that he will share his view of "up-to-date" matters in a press conference. We are to expect a more striking press conference regarding the two important fault lines: Kurdish issue and political Islam. I wonder if the general staff requests a better role instead of the low profile for the past two years in matters like Ergenekon, PKK, regional issues and political reaction. He wanted to satisfy the retired officers and voices from military quarters without crossing the democratic lines. In this speech I had expected a self-criticism on part of the TSK regarding the past.

The Chief of General Staff Gen. Başbuğ held a speech for two hours yesterday. When you take a look at the hall with a capacity of 1,200 people at the war academies there were all colors of the press and more future rather than former commanders. In general, journalists who criticize the Turkish Armed Forces, or the TSK, are not invited to this type of speech. But this time it was the opposite and even the hardest critics were invited. Başbuğ did not say anything new. It was a repetition of what was said earlier only this time the attitude and mode was different. Those expecting a new page to be opened and a new start between military and civilians were disappointed. I can say that the first chief of the TSK told a lesson to the guest as well as to all of Turkey on air explaining, "What are the Turkish Armed Forces? What are its obligations and duties? What does it think about the country’s two most important problems, the Kurdish issue and secularism?"

By all means, his speech was just like him.

As I said, his mode was different. It was not brisk, he did not show the stick, and he did not adopt an attitude of superiority. On the contrary, he tried to put TSK’s weight, which was lost from society and political life recently, back on the scale. If we look at it from a different perspective, we might say "again he poured his heart out and complained." Başbuğ said it with different words but the following are messages that I received:

w The TSK emerged from the people. It is trusted by this society and its biggest support is the people.

w The TSK serves the civil authority but it should not be perceived to be in a position of doing everything the civil authority wants. The TSK performs its duty in coordination with the civil authority. The military does not take orders from civilians. But we cannot solve all problems by using power on our own.

-Its duty is to protect basic values of the state. Basic values are independence, territorial integrity, the Republic and the secular-democratic nation state.

w The Kurdish problem wants to be transformed into an ethnic fight. But the terror organization has not been successful. Today it is bleeding.

w It’s a pity we could not integrate our Kurdish citizens sufficiently. The rights to be given to our citizens should stay within the frame of personal freedom.

w The PKK should know that it won’t be successful trying to turn this into an ethnic fight.

w In the struggle against terror;

w Participation in the organization should be prevented,

w Necessary legal changes should be made for those in the mountains to leave their hide outs,

w Financial sources of the organization should be blocked,

w The organization’s presence in northern Iraq should be silenced

The most striking part of the chief’s speech was where he talked about how the TSK is doing its job by sacrificing martyrs and veterans but in return is worn down in the name of democracy and viewed as an enemy of religion.

Başbuğ did not say it aloud but implicitly touched on the Ergenekon investigation.

He touched on the fact that with Ergenekon on one side and criticism by the liberals on the other side, TSK’s determination in the struggle against terror has been hurt. He did not mention Ergenekon explicitly but it was obvious what he meant by "judiciary autonomy and legal predominance." Another point Başbuğ exhibited sensibility on was the TSK being constantly characterized by the pious as "opponents of religion." He quoted in another part of his speech national and international scientists to make his point in this regard and talked about people who make up the TSK and their values. From his speech we could immediately tell that his reaction was strong against being labeled "opponents of religion."

After stating that opposing initiatives against secularism should not create a problem he said, "We are not against religion. We are against the use of religion as a means for politics."

After Gen. Başbuğ "described the TSK, its values and obligations, and relationship to civil authority" the only serious warnings to be noticed were the following sentences:

w "We are fulfilling our dutyÉ Don’t play games with our honor and morale. We won’t let it pass unnoticedÉ"

w It is unthinkable that the TSK will remain motionless or ineffective in view of applications against secularismÉ"

If we take a look at the coordination and people invited, then it is understood that Gen. Başbuğ thought, "Let’s tell the public full-fledged who we are and what we do." It was announced that next week there would be a press conference regarding TSK’s attitude in up-to-date issues. I wonder about reactions by those who joined this TSK lesson. Some retired officers said, "Those who read well will understand." Another part said, "It was not a strong speech. He did not mention anything new. The same old story." These speeches always go like that. Everybody understood whatever he wanted. Let’s see what we’ll encounter next week.

Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ is holding a speech at the war academies today. This may not sound extraordinary to you. But those who closely followed the Turkish Armed Forces,or TSK, Turkish politics and the AKP’s politics for the last three years attribute much importance to this speech. Especially the announcement of this speech up front and the extension of an invitation to those who the military does not approve of, makes the situation even more dramatic. Taking a quick look at the period we are leaving behind shows the importance of the timing.

The AKP, after the famous announcement made by the Turkish Armed Forces on April 27, 2007, won elections with a 47 percent majority and changed the balance in the relationship between the military and the civilians. And this change continues at full speed. Especially two developments have deepened this process. The first of the two developments is the appearance of the so-called Military Coup Diaries which are said to uncover the efforts of some generals to overthrow the AKP administration. Second is the increase of the number of retired military crew in the Ergenekon case. The impression persists that especially retired military crew are constantly preparing a conspiracy. In summary, the last three years have paved the pay for an erosion of respect for the TSK and the effectiveness of the institution to an important extent in the eyes of at least some part of the public.

The General Staff lapsed into silence during these years. Gen. Başbuğ came before us as a commander who did not speak out loud as long as it wasn’t necessary, contrary to old times. For this attitude he was applauded by the liberals, but tension increased among TSK staff and the public as their chief kept quiet. The TSK staff wants the first chief to come forward and defend the institution and foremost those generals taken into custody in the frame of the Ergenekon case.

One reason for this request is that an important part of the TSK crew perceives all attempts against the AKP as normal. Similarly, they perceived some "applications" of on-duty military staff or illegal actions of "groups including civil or retired military staff that supported the TSK" during the struggle against the PKK in the 90s also as normal.

In this case they also increasingly expect Gen. Başbuğ to come forward and defend the institution. The military public expects an "enough now" to be spoken in an effective way. The TSK is curious what type of reaction will be exhibited by Gen. Başbuğ. Will he exhibit a democratic attitude like Özkök or a brisk reaction like Kıvrıkoğlu. Expectations in the civil public have also increased.

What does the deepening and history-investigating Ergenekon case mean?

Will old accounts be opened?

Will events in the Southeast also be investigated?

How will the TSK react to all these developments?

Gen. Başbuğ really is in a difficult position.

Part of the civil public expects the chief of general staff to "leave behind his former attitude, accept mistakes in former applications rather than show brisk reaction and open a new page in relations between the military and civilians." A fairly large number of people believe he should start being defensive because saying the staff should not become upset is not convincing anymore. The other part of the civil public and the military desire that the chief of staff step forward and roar, draw red lines and stop the Ergenekon attack immediately. Gen. Başbuğ will prefer to find a compromise between the two approaches. It is expected that he in general will draw attention to the message of "not blaming the TSK for some illegal operations in the 90s."

According to sources who know about the main points of the speech and Gen. Başbuğ’s attitude, the most annoying aspect for the general staff is the tendency of the Ergenekon case to dig up the past.

It is expected that Başbuğ will warn against dangers arising from blaming the TSK for illegal actions of certain groups supporting security forces against the PKK in times of fierce terror, in which case nobody will enter into an effective struggle in the Southeast. The speech that is mainly about negative effects of the Ergenekon case on the TSK is outlined as follows:

- The TSK should not be held responsible for civilians who entered into illegal actions while supporting the military.

- We are prepared to be held responsible for TSK crew members who were involved in illegal actions.

- The TSK does not protect their crew members who were involved with gangs. We are against all illegal applications and will punish those responsible.

Gen. Başbuğ’s speech will, no matter from which angle you look at it, bring extremely important developments and shape the upcoming period to an important extent.

Readers of this column know that I had my reservations when the first Ergenekon crime gang indictment was released, especially because the initial detentions and the indictment document naturally caused doubt. It seemed that it was not worked on thoroughly. Unnecessary information was kept inside in a huge package of private talks that had nothing to do with the essence of the case. The content was partially convincing and some parts were not convincing at all. For a certain group of people there were accusations of "coup attempts" as a group of opponents were tried to be scared away.

Believe it or not, this was a widespread impression. In the second indictment that was mainly changed. There are groups who are still convinced that the Ergenekon case is a plot to keep the opposition silent and to form a regime of pressure. They will never ever change their minds. But the situation today is very different. I can easily say that we are facing something serious here. I have reached this conclusion after reading the second indictment from the beginning to end.
There are exaggerations in the second indictment. You come across so many elements that make you ask, "What does this have to do with coup attempts?" For instance, presentation of plans to topple down the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, leader Deniz Baykal or to cause a break down in the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, as a coup theory is unconvincing. Similarly, unnecessary texts of mail exchanges were used in a way to infuriate even the anchorman Uğur Dündar, private conversations and even rumors are included in the blueprint. All discredit the case.

It seems that prosecutors have dumped whatever they have into the document without having solid and reliable evidence. Ironically enough, number one enemy of the Ergenekon case was itself at the beginning. Or rather, prosecutors diluted the case through indictments and created such a mess that I am afraid this case will drown in the quagmire they created because no one believes that the judges will be able to pull off this case.

The Ergenekon lawsuit will continue for years but no conclusion will be reached easily and even the detainees will have to be released at last. It will resemble the DİSK case of the Sept. 12 period. (It had taken 15 years to reach a conclusion in the case and all the accused were acquitted in the end.)

This is what I am afraid of. Someday the real perpetrators may go free.

Despite all criticisms, exaggerations, unnecessary information and risks, the remaining claims are enough to take this case seriously. Or from a quite opposite angle, even if we say that 80 percent of this is just a boloney, the remaining 20 percent is more than enough to prove the seriousness of the Ergenekon lawsuit.

After diaries of the retired admiral Özden Örnek and journalist Mustafa Balbay are bound together with some other information, we face an incredible reality: These people wanted to create chaos in order to capsize the government and then make a coup. I believe everyone is innocent until proven guilty. But this time, I must say, my reservations are not high. And I should say that the evidence presented in the indictment point out the retired generals Şener Eruygur and Hurşit Tolon.

Frankly, I was appalled after reading it through. I was disappointed by the disagreements at the top of the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK, and to see that we had generals who plotted conspiracy theories and who hate each other. This is not the TSK I know. It means that I was living in dream. In fact, it was so all along, yet we had never realized. Traps prepared to bring down the former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök, stories of distrust about top military commanders Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt and the current chief Gen. İlker Başbuğ have shattered down public confidence for this institution.

The TSK releases statements frequently and brings to the attention that some parts of the criticisms are badly affecting the institution and are targeting to destroy the most important institution of the country. But unfortunately, the TSK has been harmed the most by its own generals inside whom we all trusted until the end. They worked in an unbelievably negative way to break the TSK apart. They played fast and loose and did not think of what huge chaos a military coup could cause to this country.

The TSK is going through a very critical time. There is the former generals’ situation on one side and there is the evidence especially in the second indictment on the other. I am sure that most of them are confused already. Even if a big chunk is exaggerated, a tiny little section will be enough to pull reactions. But what will happen next? A new page is needed to be open in order to boost up the morale inside TSK and to heal the wounds. The only person who can do this is the Chief Commander Başbuğ and we all should support him.

We followed President Obama’s visit to Turkey very closely. For two days we kept you informed. We shared with you the political intention or meaning behind the messages of the visit. After Obama left, I asked myself, "We talked about everything, but how did the American public perceive this visit?" I went through the American press and talked to diplomats and insider sources who watched this visit closely. The result was surprising. I was amazed when I saw that the American public did not quite comprehend this visit to Turkey. When I moved to the bottom of the cause, I understood why.

Let’s start with the formal wing. The U.S. administration watched this visit closely and received the necessary messages. There is no problem there. The bureaucracy knows now what the White House thinks about problems regarding Turkey and is preparing to react accordingly. The problem lies in the American public’s perception.

Attention has been drawn to the fact that this visit happened too early and without sufficient preparation. Some sources say that the administration has not yet completed its staff and team. A director of a civil society movement who said, "The media could not understand this visit. There are even some among them who still question why Turkey was visited," also said that the American public is preoccupied with economic issues and therefore cannot perceive issues like Armenia or Turkey very well.

If we take a look between the lines, we encounter the same points. What is important for the media are developments regarding huge companies on the verge of bankruptcy or how to implement decisions that resulted from the G20. There is neither interest in Cyprus, nor northern Iraq, nor Turkey’s full membership in the EU. In addition, if we look upon how the media reflects on this visit, we see before us "a message sent to the Islamic world." I paid attention and noticed that the president’s visit to the Blue Mosque and Hagia Sophia, his meeting with students, his speech at Parliament and other contacts were especially perceived as flowers offered to the Islamic world.

The most important aspect the United States saw in this visit was the fact that the American media applauded Obama quite a bit. Obama is criticized as a sophomore politician and an inexperienced statesman in his country, but in his performance during the visit to Turkey, he was reflected as a natural politician, serious statesman and influential president.

Let’s talk about Obama’s visit in the light of Armenia. The Turkish media has described the U.S. president’s meeting with the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers in Istanbul as a "surprise." Whereas, it was not a surprise. On the contrary, it was planned ahead, and the Armenian foreign minister came to Istanbul only because of this meeting.

The Armenian lobby in the United States is not very happy with the events in Turkey. And in Ankara, while responding to a question, Obama said, "I have not changed my attitude regarding genocide," and made the lobby smile. But his statement, "Despite that I will not interfere," caused the lobby to frown. The Armenian lobby is still persistently waiting for Obama to surprise everyone on April 24 and pronounce the word "genocide."

Atmosphere in Yerevan is different

Foremost, everybody is aware that the genocide issue depends on the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. Obama has put Turkey and Armenia into a tunnel. When exiting the tunnel, the border needs to be opened and the diplomatic relationship between the two countries established. The diaspora wants Yerevan not to hurry. The opening of the border and establishment of diplomatic relations might lead to a temporary suspension of the genocide dispute or even result in a burial of the issue, never to come up again. The diaspora does not want that to happen. It makes plans to accuse Turkey of genocide and seek justice thereafter. Yerevan keeps its hopes high. The words of an Armenian diplomat are very interesting: "The genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh disputes only exist in details from now on. The United States took a step and started a process. It seems that it won’t be long until a result comes up." Here we go. Let’s hope for the best.

Are we going to be able to benefit from US President Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey? Or will we once again get into small internal disputes and miss out on an opportunity? International relations are like bargaining. If you play well, you can win more easily Turkey may be in an unfortunate position in some ways, yet it is one of the world’s most fortunate countries in other respects. Many of us always complain and say, "Our neighbor is not Switzerland or Austria, so we cannot be relaxed." But Turkey’s fortune is based exactly on this position.

We feel discomfort because of the countries surrounding us, but thanks to them, our international and strategic importance increases, bringing with it great advantages. This is the U.S. perspective on us: Turkey has Iran on one side and Iraq on the otherÉ

It is a country that is involved in the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute, and in Eurasia. It has one foot in the Mediterranean and the other in the Aegean. It is a country that should be listened in each regional crisis.

It is an indispensable power for Afghanistan and an important player that contributes much to the Palestine and Lebanon issues. This is how Washington perceives Turkey. But some administrations consider Turkey as a bird in the hand, while others treat it as a strategic ally.

The first opportunity came with Bush Sr.

Two administrations that glorified Turkey and carried U.S.-Turkey relations to an incredible point have passed through Washington in recent years. One of these was the administration of Bush Sr. (former U.S. President George W. Bush's father), which cooperated with President Turgut Özal during the first Gulf War in 1991.

The Özal-Bush talks and the mutual confidence between two countries led Turkish-American relations to experience a golden age. Bush formally visited Ankara in July 1991 to thank Turkey for its extremely valuable support. Özal, not missing out on the chance, received U.S. support to solve the Cyprus issue and made an attempt with Papandreu Sr. But "hawks" in the Foreign Ministries of Turkey and Greece joined forces and prevented the attempt.

Then, Clinton passed through Ankara

This was Turkey’s most valuable opportunity, which it lost in Cyprus.

President Bill Clinton came to Turkey in November 1999. Before his visit, he had put Turkey on top of the "Ascending Countries List" during a speech at Georgetown University. A breathtaking greeting for Clinton took place here. While talking about the new dimensions of Turkish-American relations during his speech at the Parliament, Clinton said Turkey was a bridge of stabilization through which the energy lines of the region passed.

When Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, was captured in Kenya in 1998, Clinton himself made the decision to deliver Öcalan to Turkey, saying, "I am doing you this favor and you should take some steps to solve the Kurdish issue." As a result, the first plan to liquidate the PKK was launched, but the plan could not be finalized. So Turkey could not benefit from this opportunity, either.

The U.S. is a superpower. On whichever issue the U.S. exerts its authority, particularly the European Union, Cyprus, Armenia and the Kurdish dispute, it facilitates Turkey’s work. Now, we face a third opportunity. The attitude of the Obama administration is ahead of the others.

Of course, he has expectations. But he also has something to offer in return. This time, Turkey is different. It is perceived differently by Europe. If we look at Hillary Clinton’s attitude during her Ankara visit, it looks like Turkey’s star will rise on the horizon of Washington.

I wonder whether we will be able to benefit from this situation. Or will we once again get into small internal disputes and miss out on an opportunity because of fruitless political fights? International relations are like bargaining. If you calculate and play well, you can win more easily.