Mehmet Ali Birand - English

Yesterday I tried to explain to you how much danger is involved in the overall attitudes of Israel and the United States. Today, even if it means repeating myself, I’d like to touch on who will gain from the events experienced at Gaza. I wonder if Hamas will become stronger or be wiped out. I wonder if Israel through the Gaza operation will be able to break Palestine’s resistance. According to some, Hamas will receive a nasty blow and not recover any time soon. I don’t agree. Hamas will receive a nasty blow regarding their military and will weaken. But their prestige will increase and the Arab world will recognize them. Hamas receives support from an important part of the Arabs. After all, these days the reason for many Arab countries to keep quiet, and foremost Egypt, is Hamas’s radical attitude. But so much blood is shed in Gaza that no matter how much they resist, Arab countries will in the end oppose Hamas whether it’s unwillingly or out of mercy. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, who does not like Hamas at all and secretly wishes that Israel would wipe them out, is slowly changing its attitude. Even if it is compulsory the PLO supports Gaza. This is Hamas’s biggest gain in the medium- and long-term. The Gaza operation will be seen as the rebirth of Hamas. Israel may obtain important advantages seen from a military perspective, but will encounter a loss in the medium- and long-term. It will not recover easily from this burden.

Looking at my articles for the past two days it is very symbolic that someone like me believing Israel to persist its presence has come to this point. The biggest loss for Israel will be people thinking like me. Today it may continue with its politics as it pleases because of the United States, but tomorrow or the day after they will notice that the balance has changed. Then it’ll be too late to even fix certain things.

Israel has a right to live. Nobody, including Hamas, can take this right away. But likewise, Israel has to acknowledge Palestine’s right to live and return territory, at least the ones invaded over the past 10 years with the purpose of settlement, so they can build their own state.

Militants in Turkey are happy
If looked upon from an indifferent perspective, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, administration approaches the Gaza crises generally in a balanced way. It does not apply cheap politics even if it were to lose militant votes. It criticizes Israel, but doesn’t break ties. It keeps up contact with countries that have a say in the region. It’s easy to criticize AKP’s each and every step. But we need to accept some realities. Turkey’s diplomatic attempts today are restrained. To expect more would only be imaginary. On the contrary, it seems as if the Gaza events have given Islamic militants in Turkey the opportunity they were looking for, beyond measure. For the first time we encounter such brisk and organized reaction from the Turkish public. It’s helpful to repeat. AKP being the administration puts Turkey, in this respect, at an ease.

The task of saving Turkey from one of our biggest shames in history was bestowed on the AKP. Whoever took that decision, it is not important whether it was the prime minister or someone else, the important thing was to be brave enough to take that decision and show maturity. Turkey bore this shame for 58 years on its shoulders. Now let’s take a look at the past. Think about those who separated Nazım from his loved ones, those who went to prison because they read his poems and were labeled communist, those who were laid off and those who were removed from their office as public servant. Remember those ugly people who went on a communist hunt and those minds who earned their living by opposing Nazım in a merciless and hostile way. A part of these people surely still lives and runs after others, only this time in the name of the struggle against Kurds. Turkey had to wait 58 years to be rid of this unproductive way of thinking. What a pity, that even the government spokesman, Çiçek, decreased the importance and value of restoring the citizenship of Nazım Hikmet by saying, "even UNESCO has announced a Nazım year." Instead of showing braveness he linked it to international developments. It no longer is important whether Turkey has forgiven Nazım and made up for its mistake. Let’s think about whether Nazım would forgive Turkey.

It is impossible for someone with some amount of logic not to feel horrified by what’s being experienced in Gaza. Poor Palestinians are being forced into the corner, hit by the huge Israeli army. The word "being hit" would be too light. They are openly butchered. The whole world is in uproar, but the United States takes Israel under its wing and helps fight Hamas. It takes part in the murder. Israel’s announcement is insufficient:

"Hamas has bombarded us with rockets. Killed our people. In the end we had no choice, but to do this operation. Hamas, from day one of its administration has prevented the peace process. We had no choice but to protect ourselvesÉ"

This explanation may have been true way back in the past, but not anymore. It is obvious that Israel will only sign for peace in the region if its own rules are applied.

Israel does not keep any of its promises.

I’m not talking about former land belonging to Palestine; Israel is constantly building settlement points on Palestinian ground. Fanatic pious Jews invade their territory at gunpoint.

Israel’s peace is not based on equality or compromise. Israel wants to keep Jerusalem under its control, cram Palestinians into a ghetto surrounded by walls and eliminate all resistance. This is not called peace.

This is called a crime against humanity. If they go even further it could also be called genocide. Palestinians have chosen Hamas as a means of leadership. The purpose is to cast away Israelis from land they had invaded formerly.

What’s more natural than this?

As long as Israel keeps behaving this way, Hamas will continue bombarding them and bombing. If the United States and Israel continue this thick-headedness they will not only drive the region but the whole world toward a new disaster.

Not today maybe not even tomorrow. This attitude gives new strength to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and all others who are in favor of political Islam.

Israel and the United States prepare themselves for their own and our disaster.

This general attitude of Israel and the United States deepens the Muslim-Christian separation a little bit more.



Turkey to become more militant

The millions who sympathize with the Taliban or al-Qaeda will increase and they will believe that the United States is on a Muslim hunt in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel in Palestine.

Those who believe that this is unjust and that the situation will continue as long as no reaction is shown, will drop more bombs and plan more suicide attacks. Hostility toward the United States and Israel will boil. Everything representing these two countries, including embassies and places of businesses will be under threat.

Especially Iran acquiring nuclear weapons will not be preventable anymore.

Besides Arab countries that are neutral and cannot pass beyond being an audience in these matters, Tehran is posing hope. As soon as it is able to construct its own nuclear weapon it will become the region’s indisputable force. I wonder if Washington is not able to see all these possibilities?

Of course it does. So then what does Washington want to do?

There are two possibilities:

Either, it closes its eyes to Israel because it is pretty sure that the Islamic world and especially the Arabs will not do anything and the Palestinians will stay motionless no matter how much they are beaten up.

Or the United States wants to provoke militant Islam. And it counts on an inter-religious war that will result in their favor and in the interest of the Christian world.

After witnessing Washington’s miscalculations in Iraq, I find it very natural for them to make new mistakes.



Political Islam in Turkey revolting

It is impossible for Turkey not to be influenced by events in Palestine. We already see slight movements. Those who do not want to miss this opportunity and create a militant society are planning to take action.

It doesn’t take much effort to create a fanatic Islam and send people off to their death in the name of religion.

Luckily Turkey has in this period the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, administration. If the AKP were the opposition today it would be a simple matter for them to call people out on the street in the name of jihad.

In case the United States and Israel continue with their attitude, they’d have to calculate that their relation with Turkey would become difficult. They should not be surprised at brisk reactions from Ankara.

These two countries persistently dig a hole. Someday they will be the ones to fall in it. There will be no pity for them but we will pay the actual bill. This region will be soaked in blood.

The Ergenekon case started in 2008 and it would have become the year’s event if it hadn’t been overshadowed by dubious charges by the attorney general and some constraints in the accusations, or by claims based on wire tapping and the spreading of unnecessary information. There seems to be no end to this case in 2009. Better to say that 2009 will be a cross road for the Ergenekon legend. Either the prosecution office will prove to us unexpectedly through surprise witnesses and new information that the case is justified, or the case will no longer prevail in our agendas because of lack of interest from the media.

In the beginning Ergenekon was a first. For the first time, untouchable illegal operations outside the formal state were touched. The Deep State, even though it is not determined what or who they were, was for the first time on trial before the law. It created great anxiety in this respect.

In the early morning hours of Jan. 20, anxiety started with the detention of Veli Küçük and eight people; turned into disappointment with the detention of editorial writer İlhan Selçuk and Doğu Perinçek on March 21, and it became serious with the detention of two full generals, Hurşit Tolon and Şener Eruygur, on July 1. During the Susurluk investigation the military could not be touched. This time two full generals were taken out of their army- controlled homes. There are still questions regarding Ergenekon. It would be nice if in 2009 the relationship between the Deep State and those who closed their eyes to the Hrant Dink murder, those who killed priest Santoro and those who organized other events were revealed. Otherwise the Deep State will again get off the hook.

AKP’s ascending period will end
In 2009 the most important development in regards to politics will be local elections. In general local elections are good for administrations. Those who benefit from municipalities chose a candidate from the present administration party. The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is in this respect has the advantage. On the other hand candidates of the opposition, some places exempt, are weak in general. Meaning, there is no competition. Especially if we consider the effects of coal and food distribution to the poor, the AKP is expected to win easily.

But we should not forget about the fact that this party is slowly experiencing administration fatigue and an erosion of prestige. The AKP will experience a big handicap due to fraud accusations, the feeling of weariness in society, and more importantly, when the economic crisis starts showing its effects in the months to come, especially in the field of unemployment. One will look at how many votes the administrative party has obtained and not how many municipalities it won. The result will be compared to the 47 percent achieved in general elections. Besides the secular portion of society will use its votes and form a bloc. Meaning everybody will withdraw to their own camp. Taking into account that the Democratic Society Party, or DTP, takes back all votes that it formerly lost in the Southeast, we can expect the AKP to drop below 47 percent. Meaning the end of the ascending period.

The most critical development in 2009 will be in relations between Turkey and the European Union. For, in the decision taken in December 2006, the EU had stated that in case Turkey does not open its air and sea ports to Cypriot ships and aircrafts, meaning it has not conformed to the customs union, then the status of negotiations will be revised in December 2009.

I don’t think that there will be a result achieved in Cyprus. There is no such political intention shown on the Turkish or on the Greek side. Based on this possibility the EU might just suspend negotiations all together in 2009. Such a development may only be prevented if Turkey quickly takes up reforms and accelerates them, but I don’t see such a possibility. The AKP seems like it will continue its lack of emotion, if nothing unexpected happens.

In this case, will the EU be able to cut relations with Turkey? For suspending negotiations means not being able to restart them again. It would be naive to expect 27 countries to give a "yes" vote without receiving anything in return. Despite everything, I don’t believe the EU would cut Turkey loose. The commission would not suggest such an irreversible act. Chances are, Turkey will be given additional time.

The grim side of 2009 will be the growth of the crisis left for us by 2008. First it was a monetary crisis then it spread to the real economy sector. We thought it would be tangential but it wasn’t.

Economic crisis
Expected external funds will not arrive. Hell will break lose in the months to come. The first prevention firms will take is to lay off employees. The starting point of the crisis was the United States. From there it will spread to Europe. But everybody will pay the bill. The expectation in general is that this economic constriction will last until the end of 2009 or even the first half of 2010. The United States and Europe have built immense funds in order to protect their own companies. Our government, on the contrary, first denied and then, realizing that there is no escape, started to roll up its sleeves.

This crisis is AKP’s biggest fear. The AKP will lose votes because it will not be able to protect from deep wounds created by the crises; it’s not because of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP’s, MHP’s or any other party’s for that matter, effective politics. In crisis matters I’m pessimistic. I suppose that we will not be able to recover and lose a lot of blood if today’s formal attitude does not change.

The never changing and most important aspect of our agenda in 2009 will be again the PKK terror. Depending on the outcome of the local elections the intensity of the terror will either increase or decrease. But it will never subside. The Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, will again hit the cities É organize incursions toward security forces and keep up attention of the public. A lot of blood will be shed but the PKK will not achieve its target. Its biggest loss will be its former comfort in northern Iraq. It will not lose its caves and training centers in Quandil but won’t be able to establish camps along the border. It will be impossible for them to receive weapons or outfit supplies from Europe or other sources and for organization leaders to safely run around anymore.

Turkey’s position in the region
The foremost reason is that the Turkish government changed its attitude toward Barzani and Barzani in return decided to fine tune his politics in order not to antagonize Turkey. In 2009 relations between Ankara and Arbil will warm, mutual visits will increase and a new period will start. This declination will not mean that Barzani will kick the PKK out of northern Iraq or fight it, but put Turkey at ease. Let’s not forget that Turkey bombarding its PKK targets in northern Iraq can only be accomplished because the United States closes its eyes. After a while the responsibility of the region will pass to Baghdad and Arbil. If we sum up, in 2009 the PKK will be in trouble increasing the intensity of terror but will not achieve anything, foremost Öcalan.

The most unknown equation for 2009 is the politics of the new president of the United States, Obama, in respect to Turkey. For example will he pass the Armenian genocide allegations through congress? What will his attitude be toward the Cyprus issue?

These are important variables. What is known though is that while the United States is getting ready to separate from Iraq it has increased need for Turkey’s support É it will need Turkey’s support in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power É it awaits Turkish soldiers in the fight against the resurrected Taliban in Afghanistan Éit will want to use the Turkish shield again against the progressing power increase of Russia É it is looking for the support of Turkey to protect peace in the Middle East.

Today’s environment and politics of AKP administration strengthens Turkey’s position in the region. In almost all problems Turkey’s voice can be heard. Sometimes it functions as a mediator, sometimes it plays the role of a catalyst; it does not turn its back on the region anymore. On the contrary, it attends to everybody’s problems.

In such a situation, we should not expect Obama to offend Turkey or take an attitude of pushing Turkey into a corner. On the contrary, we should expect Washington to support Ankara in EU negotiations, to take part in decision mechanisms regarding problems in the region. In short, we should expect Turkey’s strategic value to increase.

Historians will describe 2008 as the "beginning of a period in which the change in the relationship of the Turkish Armed Forces with political administrations was clarified." In order for me to talk about my observation, I first need to remind you of the public’s former perception in respect to the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK. For the majority of Turkish Society, especially for the secular, educated middle and upper class, the TSK was a guarantee of the system.

It was considered the keeper of secularism. Within this frame it was perceived as the impartial censor of administrations. An institution purified of fraud, serious, disciplined, well-educated and only concerned for its motherland, and if need be "asked to defend the regime or motherland in the name of its people."

The Turkish society for years used to see its soldiers as their cure-all supermen. People would take their complaints about administrations contradicting the system to the military, and generals would take it as their duty to interfere to administrations upon the request of the people. And they would be applauded for this. The TSK would fondly fulfill their duty. Whenever the TSK would interfere, it would not do so for more than 1 or 2 years showing that their intention was not to use this for self interest. This situation gave them an immense power. People would trust the military more than the individuals it elected. The military would use its position very well. If need be it would through a declaration or a statement administrations take a step back, change their decision or even resign from their duty.

Then, with the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, taking over the government in 2002, this balance slowly started to change.

And in 2008 a new balance was established.

From journals published in the magazine Nokta we learned that in 2004 commanders-in-chief engaged in preparations for a military coup in order to stop the AKP, but did not receive the expected support from the period’s General Staff Gen. Özkök and thus could not deepen their plan further. Despite Gen. Özkök received great reactions from the secular portion of society, it became obvious over time that he prevented action against the AKP. But with the appointment of Gen. Büyükanıt to the office of the General Staff, TSK’s attitude changed. Especially when the AKP wanted to position Abdullah Gül with his wife, who wears a headscarf, in Çankaya, the secular portion went crazy. Fear of losing the system spread and people started to appeal to the TSK. In the period of 2006 to 2007 Gen. Büyükanıt behaved the way secularists wanted him to. In secular matters as well as in northern Iraq matters, a constant dispute, even a quarrel had started.

The General Staff criticized the administration whenever possible... the military did not invite wives with a headscarf to receptions... the military took on an obvious attitude during Republic meetings organized by secular groups and in spectacles marching toward AnıtkabirÉ finally the biggest misfortune happened on the night of April 27, 2007, when the TSK posted an announcement on its Web site which was written in a more brisk manner than an internal memorandum. According to some this was an ultimatum. The AKP was the target and briskly accused before elections on July 22. The TSK played its conservative role and wanted the administration to change. Only this time things developed in an unusual way.

The administration responded to the announcement in the same brisk manner. On July 22, the AKP increased its votes from 37 to 47 percent, got the message across to the TSK, "We don’t share the same view with you."

Old balances were disturbed.

The TSK, despite its announcement on April 22, could not say a word. In 2008 this new balance was clinched. Gül became president. Republican meetings subsided. On May 5, after Erdoğan met with Gen. Büyükanıt "privately for three hours," all of a sudden old disputes between the TSK and the administration subsided completely. The new General Staff Gen. Başbuğ changed old attitudes completely. A TSK emerged that is true to basic principles, but not in dispute with the administration, a TSK that does its job well, does not talk as long as there is no need, a TSK that attaches priority to fight the PKK terror and tries to protect the society’s safety. In summary, 2008 was a year that made it clear that there has been an end to the period in which the Turkish Armed Forces used to interfere in political administrations.

Feeling the need to explain themselves
The first most obvious side of Gen. Başbuğ during the first period of his position was to repair broken hearts and brisk reactions that were experienced during the period of the AKP administration and to establish communication with all parts of the country. TSK’s struggle with the PKK increased this communication need. We all know the result of 2008: PKK: 670 dead. 224 wounded and surrendered. Military: 109 martyrs, 94 wounded.Civilians: 24 dead, 50 wounded. Compared to results in the past, one can call it a successful year for the TSK. But what really left its mark on 2008 was, that, based on an information sharing agreement with Washington, thousands of soldiers went a PKK hunt, called Güneş Operasyonu (Sun Operation), in snowy mountains in the border region, which started on Feb. 21 and lasted 8 days, for one full year unmanned aircrafts observed and bombarding took place. The "Güneş Operasyonu" struck PKK’s preparations unexpectedly. This operation, which taken on in snow and with big risks disturbed the terror organization’s spring-summer attempts on a large scale.

For the first time, the TSK hit the PKK in its own cove. Unmanned aircraft were a novelty of 2008. In Gen. Büyükanıt’s words, thanks to these aircraft, "PKK operations turned into a ’Big Brother’ game," that made it difficult for the PKK to pass cross border from northern Iraq into Turkey, but did not cease it completely. However, with Washington providing information to Ankara helped limiting PKK’s activities in northern Iraq and posed a turning point in this regard. In 2008 two unfortunate events were experienced that made the TSK upset and caused question marks to rise in the mind of the public. The first event took place on Sept. 21, 2007, when eight soldiers were taken hostage by the PKK in Dağlıca during an incursion and released after several days. The other event took place on May 10, 2008, when 19 PKK members were killed, 17 of our soldiers were martyred and 21 of our soldiers wounded during an incursion in Aktütün-Bayraktepe. These two events created reaction in the public. They spread the impression that the TSK is not as successful as set forth and that neglect took place. A never-seen-before criticism campaign was then seen. This time it wasn’t the pious, but also the secular media throwing arrows.

The TSK, for the first time, after these events, felt like it had to explain how the struggle with terror is done, how much devotion and patience were necessary and how the TSK runs this struggle. Formerly one used to say "Say hi to the army and carry on with your path." Now the army is called to account. The Chief of General Staff himself has told the cabinet, including the prime minister, "Here is what we did," and organized consecutive briefings with the media. Weekly press briefings started. The TSK for the first time felt like explaining itself and its work and processes. It was understood from the communication that the job of commanders was not sermonizing at ceremonies or talk in purple prose regarding motherland and people, but to inform its people. For the TSK, 2008 was looking from this perspective like an unforgettable year.

Erdoğan was the man of 2008. The year’s event: Headscarf combats. But what shocked our daily lives most for the past 12 months was the PKK, who controlled the agenda as it wished. The most obvious mental state of the terror organization was FEAR. The PKK was scared by the vote explosion for the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, in the southeast during the elections in July 2007. Thinking that the Democratic Society Party, or DTP, would bring out 40 parliament members easily, coming up with only 20 members created a huge disappointment. PKK leaders were certain that, without any effort, they’d be able to receive all the votes of the people of Kurdish origin. DTP municipalities not being able to supply sufficient services, and more importantly, the AKP distributing charity to the poor in the region and Erdoğan’s interpretation of "Kurds" had upset existing balances. And especially when the impression was added on top this that the AKP was pushed around by the secular state, votes surprisingly went to the AKP.

After the elections in August 2007, this fear was observed very clearly during the general assembly in Quandil. If there wasn’t to be an end to this, even Diyarbakır could be lost in the local elections in 2009. AKP staff was openly announcing target municipalities in the southeast as their goal anyway. This possibility meant that the PKK would collapse and the DTP would be erased from the face of the region. One other aspect that the PKK feared was that in November 2007 Erdoğan convinced Bush to accept the sharing of information regarding activities in northern Iraq, and especially along the border. The PKK would be pressured military and political matters.

Events shaping 2008 were planned within this frame. Increased terror:

The most important aspect for the PKK is to shed more blood in the region and in Turkey, to plan more spectacular assassinations, huge demonstrations take the youth to the streets and make security forces respond in a brutal way. This way they would have control over the agenda and gather its supporters again. The PKK shed blood for one year, as they had planned. Great events and huge demonstrations were conducted. It committed crimes that got cities up in arms and created immense reactions in rural areas.

The PKK chose the most treasonous tactic and killed soldiers and civilians alike by using remote-controlled mines. With operations in Dağlıca and Aktütün it paved the way for rising doubts in the minds of the Turkish public regarding the effectiveness of security forces. For the first time, the Turkish public encountered articles in the news full of criticism regarding the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK. Up until now this was never seen before. Especially the leaking of information out of the General Staff was never heard of before. The PKK’s general attitude was to create a fight between the Turks and Kurds, or even grounds for a civil war. But despite all efforts, it was not successful.

Not being able to transfer enough power into Turkey from its northern Iraq camps was one other aspect in which it was unsuccessful. TSK’s air and ground operations as well as the reduction of support by Barzani’s administration made PKK’s life harder. In the end, the PKK planned 149 armed attacks in 2008. 109 of our soldiers were martyred and their loss amounted to 670. Maybe they received much attention from the public and were much talked about, but the result of PKK’s terror was a big failure.

In summary, the PKK was on our agenda with its demonstrators, gathered supporters and increased the number of those who went into the mountains and took up arms but did not reach anything in military matters. Their weakness against the TSK continued.

DTP surrendered
It is not certain whether the DTP decided to act like this or the PKK forced it to come to the forefront. What’s certain is that the DTP and PKK consented and this party, especially in the middle of 2008, identified itself with the PKK. Before it used to be reluctant and overshadow relations with the PKK as much as possible. As the decision regarding a closing case, which was filed in 2007, approached, the DTP openly started to defend the PKK. Leaders of the PKK and DTP took on an attitude as if they wanted the party to be closed. DTP for the first time started to describe the PKK as an organization born out of the Kurdish people.

Afterwards, a campaign was started to lay claim to Öcalan, and better his conditions in İmralı. "Freedom for Öcalan" wasn’t expressed explicitly, but it seemed as if they were getting there slowly. Finally, the last step was taken when through the DTP Kurdish demands were revealed. In some sort of a federation frame they requested that the Kurds be able to manage themselves and that all constrictions in language education be lifted.

Neither the PKK nor DTP could come close to their target

They bothered all of us. Attracted the public’s attention and controlled the agenda. But neither the PKK nor the DTP could fulfill their expectations.

The PKK could not force Turkish security forces to give in. It could not keep some regions under its control. Regional camps, especially along the border to northern Iraq, could not survive. Along the border, entries and exits have mostly been limited. Turkish security forces along with the American information service and Barzani’s lack of support the organization experienced pressure. Based on an agreement with Iran, the region of Quandil was constantly bombarded. Maybe strategic caves and camps in Quandil were not vacated but the organization was not able to stick its head out of its shelters.

Despite all efforts, the DTP could not establish a dialogue with Turkey in the name of Kurds. It couldn’t become an actor in the search for results. The first factor for it to be pushed in the background was that the Turkish Republic did not become involved in dialogue; and the second factor was that the PKK wanted to remain the sole actor and not have the DTP steal its role.

The most important handicap for the PKK was that it slowly started to lose its external alleys. Barzani’s approach to Ankara É Iran taking a coordinated struggle decision simultaneously with Turkey É the European Union Parliament identifying the organization as a terrorist group and supporting Ankara É Washington preferring Ankara. If we summon up, the PKK received much attention in 2008 but could not shake Turkey.

2008 was hard. There is no indication that 2009 will be any better. But whatever happens we already saw the worst. We will experience betterment with each passing day. I hope so. I wish all of you, whether you like me or not, whether you praise or criticize me, a healthy and happy new year.

The year 2008 will in the future be labeled "the start of headscarf combat" by historians. This principle, characterized as the ideology of the Turkish Republic, has been challenged.

As the AKP unexpectedly and surprisingly based for different reasons received 47 percent of the votes during elections in July 2007 and entered Parliament with a smooth majority, the attitude of the leaders of the party changed rapidly especially in the headscarf issue.

Erdoğan, for the first time, accepted the headscarf as a political symbol and did not expect to encounter such resistance when he started the campaign. More than the leading staff of his 47 percent majority party the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, the prime minister’s mind was occupied with "not to miss this opportunity." According to him, the liberation of the headscarf in universities meant it would take a burden off his chest. The symbolic meaning of the liberation of the headscarf in universities was very important to the AKP, but whatever happened, it happened during the constitutional changes regarding the headscarf.

The AKP was alarmed when it took the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, into its service regarding the headscarf. According to some, Erdoğan stepped into the MHP’s trap, but the problem arose during negotiations for the planned constitutional changes. Especially when there was no sentence added to the paragraph regarding the change saying "this only applies to universities," the secular portion of society to revolted. The AKP took such a stance that it seemed like the headscarf would be liberated in all governmental offices after it had been liberated in universities. Whereas a sentence such as mentioned above would have put secularists at ease and AKP’s step wouldn’t have been perceived as a threat. But no, the prime minister did not want to obligate himself. He chose to ignore the secularist’s expectation that the headscarf will not be liberated in official departments. He had an attitude as if saying "I received the votes of half the people. I will not bow in front of the secularists who are a minority."

Headscarf lost the first combat
The secularist portion seriously got worried. The AKP scared and startled the secularists in an unnecessary way.

An incredible opposition was formed and this secular opposition used all options at hand. In a psychological state of "being in a tight corner" these people bent the law and interpreted it differently. This wasn’t enough; they filed a lawsuit for closing the AKP. The burden of a historical decision, usually to be handled among the political parties in Parliament, was laid on the 11 judges of the Constitutional Court, just to escape the majority of the AKP. These 11 judges were under immense pressure.

You know the result.

The 11 judges made prudent decisions.

On June 5, 2008, nine out of 11 members voted for the cancellation of the constitutional changes regarding the headscarf.

The lawsuit regarding the closing of the AKP was dismissed July 30, 2008, because the requested number, seven, of votes was not achieved. This way Turkey was saved from a big chaos. On the contrary, the first of the headscarf combat resulted in a defeat for the AKP. The justification of the Constitutional Court was so strict that from now on it made it impossible to engage in a new attempt. The case of liberating the headscarf in universities has been closed once and for all. The Constitutional Court, in agreement with the decision by the European Court of Human Rights, has taken away the political symbol of a portion of society.

The combat is lost; can the headscarf win the battle?
The combat has been lost, but is this case closed? Or will, in the future, the headscarf win the ultimate battle?

I think that’s quite possible.

There were a few institutions that accepted the headscarf as a political symbol and perceived it as a threat to the secular system and headed all attempts to prevent it.

University rectors É The Office of the Board of Higher Education, or YÖK, the Constitutional Court and Çankaya É

Some of these four institutions have changed anyway. The rest will change within 10 years. The majority of the university rectors are candidates that are in favor of the liberation for the headscarf who will ease the application.

YÖK, with the change of its president last year, is not a castle of secularists anymore. Similarly, as opposed to former times, the Presidency at Çankaya, takes an attitude in favor of the headscarf. There is only the Constitutional Court left, which within at most 10 years will change from within and those who don’t see the headscarf as a threat to the secular system will be the majority.

The headscarf may have lost the combat this year, but looking at the balance likely to change, we could easily say that it will win the battle.

In case the AKP wins two more elections, it can easily build an environment for the liberation of the headscarf in universities and official places. Weapons in the hand of the secular portion of society are not that strong anymore. So what’s left to do, is to get well organized in political sense and gather around a party that is likely to obtain the administration, which seems difficult at the moment.

Tayyip Erdoğan left his mark on 2008 together with developments that were influenced by events in which again Tayyip Erdoğan played the lead. The man of the year 2008 was indisputably Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

For the prime minister, everything started to change with elections on July 27, 2007. Despite the brisk reaction of the military and demonstrations by hundreds of secularists filling the arenas, he had raised his votes to 47 percent which surprised everybody including himself. Entering 2008, he had defeated the military and opposition, and obtained a never-before-seen majority in Parliament. He was in a position where he could do anything. But he was at the same time all by himself.

His closest political friend who calmed him down when he became furious, his mentor next to him, Abdullah Gül, was in Çankaya. Arınç and Şener with whom he went on this journey were no longer there. Erdoğan started 2008 off as Turkey’s strongest and the Justice and Development Party, or AKP’s only man. He made his biggest mistake just in such an environment. While responding to a question in Spain on Jan. 14, he lit the fire for attempting the admittance of the headscarf at universities putting aside the Constitution changes project. He was probably going to regret this step later on, but he was so certain of himself and his party that he thought he even no longer needed the European Union.

Nobody could understand why he made this important strategy change. He knew that he had stepped on a sore spot for the secular portion the society and had opened Pandora’s Box. But he must have said "we have received 47 percent of the votes. Half of the country wants us. If we cannot make our portion of society happy in respect to the headscarf we will never be able to," because he did not change his path. The rest developed in rapid succession. The secularists revolted. Lawsuits were filed at the Constitutional Court first against the headscarf and then for the closure case against the AKP. These developments first spoiled the chemistry of the AKP. Then the country became tense. The Prime Minister’s aggressive side came into prominence. He started to fight with everyone and everything.

There was no longer an Erdoğan who used to listen to his surrounding or who used to benefit from different views É he became "the man." An Erdoğan who does not listen to anyone, but only takes decisions. For this reason he could neither manage constitutional changes nor the headscarf dispute very well. He pursued a policy of ups and downs. Took wrong steps. He could not even figure out the Kurdish problem, although he was applauded by everyone in this matter.

I’m not sure, have you seen the latest Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, or TESEV report on the Kurdish problem? It’s called, "A road map to the solution of the Kurdish problem; Recommendations from the region to the government." The interesting part is that this report reveals mutual points of meetings with political trends associations in the Southeast and many people who are in a leading and respected position among the Kurds.

Up until now many works, surveys and evaluations have been published regarding "solution propositions." But none of them summarized mutual meetings based on civil grounds like TESEV’s does. It is a work that should attract the interest of politicians, the military and the press.

The mutual point of the report is that the solution to the Kurdish problem lies in language and education and is an "absolute must." The following are concrete suggestions:

w By changing the Constitution and the national education basic law, the way should be paved for Kurdish as a second language, or as an elective.

w Language prohibition regarding the right to organize and the freedom of expression should be lifted.

w Name changes for places should be prevented and those that have changed should be returned.

w Preaching in mosques in the region should be allowed in Turkish and Kurdish.

w To medical establishments in the region, Kurdish speaking personnel should be appointed.

w To courts of law in the region, Kurdish speaking personnel should be appointed.

w Institutes for Kurdish studies should be established working on the Kurdish language and literature at universities.

Of course besides this list, there are many suggestions. But these are the points stressed by nearly all segments. This list reflects the indispensable expectations of our citizens of Kurdish origin. Now if we were to say "no buddy, the county cannot be split like that," we then couldn’t solve the Kurdish problem, but we would create a fertile swamp for the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, to turn green in. This is important to know. On top of the list of people of Kurdish origin comes a name that makes Turkey proud, Yaşar Kemal.

Yaşar Kemal is characteristic for not using his Kurdish identity, neither in the domestic nor international arena. If he wished so he would have been a flag bearer for the Kurdish problem and talk about how the Turkish government oppresses the Kurds. This way he would have gained much more than he has until now. He didn’t É On the contrary, he supported that the problem could not be solved with arms. He said that a civil war and armed conflict will harm the Kurds as well. He warned both sides. Recently, we visited him together with Zülfü Livaneli and former True Path Party, or DYP, congressman Sedat Aloğlu.

He started off talking to me, "look M. Ali listen to me carefullyÉ" and then spoke about all his experience. He said, "If the administration wants to show his intention to solve the Kurdish problem, the indispensable and only step to take is to provide for the right to their language and lift all constraints." Yaşar Kemal does not insist on anything else. It’s just the mother tongue.

He draws attention to the fact that one thing that is important for mankind is that he cannot give up is speaking, writing and communicating in his mother tongue. He also draws attention to the fact that those who are limited in the usage of their mother tongue will always show reaction, not accept the place they live in as theirs and feel oppressed. The way to turn somebody against you is to prohibit his basic need, meaning his mother tongue. Thinking about Yaşar Kemal’s words it is impossible not to understand his so very true point. Let’s put ourselves in the position of our Kurdish citizens. Let’s assume they are the majority and we are in their position and the government prohibits us to speak Turkish, to name many of us and places we live in, in the Turkish language, prohibits Turkish TV, radio and songs and prevents Turkish lessons and for many of us to teach our mother tongue. How would you feel? This is how the Kurds feel. The findings in the TESEV report correspond to what Yaşar Kemal said to us.